The Continuation of the Arab-Iranian Knot
The Iranian reformist thinker Sadegh Zibakalam of the University of Tehran states: “It seems that we Iranians have not yet forgotten our historic defeat at the hands of the Arabs, nor have we forgotten the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah, even after 1,400 years. We still harbor deep-seated resentment and animosity toward the Arabs, like a fire smoldering beneath the ashes, ready to burst into flames whenever the opportunity arises. Intellectuals despise Arabs, and even the religious are repelled by them. Moreover, the hatred and resentment many Iranians hold toward Arab symbols are, in fact, the other side of their aversion to Arabs.” Despite the widespread use of Arabic words in official correspondence and everyday speech, this linguistic presence does not signify cultural acceptance or a sense of belonging to the Arab world; rather, the opposite is closer to the truth. Iranians feel compelled to use Arabic vocabulary and have never made serious attempts, under the Shah and others, to “purify” it by replacing Arabic terms with Persian equivalents whenever possible.
Although Iranians accepted Islam, they have not, even after 1,400 years, embraced it as part of the state’s identity, neither among the government nor the populace. To overcome this feeling, they do not hesitate to repeat the claim that Iranians endowed Islam with its linguistic, religious, and civilizational depth. They cite dozens of examples to demonstrate that the majority, if not all, of those who compiled authentic hadiths, established Islamic schools of thought, and formulated the rules of the Arabic language were Persians. Furthermore, the majority of “Islamic scholars” were also Persians.
The problem, however, is that Iran’s ruling elite, unlike the majority of Islamic countries, derives its religious and sectarian legitimacy from the Arabic language and religion. Yet, due to “national pride,” it does not lean toward the Arabs. It believes that its history and civilization place it in a superior position compared to those who defeated and ruled their lands for centuries. This means that this internal conflict may persist indefinitely. After all attempts to reconcile these contradictions failed, and despite trying—and temporarily succeeding—in ruling several Arab states in a quasi-direct manner, the regime has struggled to achieve balance.
To achieve this balance, Professor Mohammad Al-Rumaih says the system has followed two parallel paths. The first is to exaggerate the sectarian dimension outside Iran, particularly in some Arab countries, to demonstrate that the influence of the Islamic Republic extends through sectarian affiliation. This narrative addresses the Iranian domestic audience as evidence of strength and expansion. The second path involves maintaining political and psychological distance from Arabs, even using terms with negative connotations such as “al-Arab,” a Quranic expression originally used to describe a specific group considered backward in terms of Islamic values. However, it was later employed ambiguously to serve political discourse more than linguistic or religious accuracy.
This duality reveals that the crisis is not limited to foreign policy but extends to the very definition of the state’s identity: Is it a Persian nationalist state, a trans-national religious state, or a sectarian project seeking to expand influence? Combining these three projects simultaneously has resulted in official discourse filled with contradictions. Notably, broad segments of the Iranian public do not share this vision. Educated and modernized segments contributed to the downfall of the previous regime and aspired to build a modern state that interacts with the world and benefits from its achievements. However, the course of the revolution took a different direction, ultimately marginalizing these forces in favor of the religious establishment and security apparatus.
For all these reasons, the Islamic Republic has failed to resolve the identity dilemma. It has neither succeeded in building a stable nationalist state nor presented a religious model capable of coexisting with the modern era, nor managed to establish normal relations with its neighborhood or the wider world.
Thus, its external crisis appears as an extension of a deeper internal one: the elite’s inability to resolve the question, “Who are we?” Many of the conflicts gripping the region cannot be understood without this profound ambiguity surrounding the identity of the Iranian state. This ambiguity leaves political decision-making hostage to vacillation between nationalism, religion, and revolution, preventing the emergence of a project capable of producing a balanced state at peace with itself, let alone with others. In short, when a state fails to define itself, anyone who differs from it is viewed as an adversary, and conflict becomes a means of asserting its own identity. Until tomorrow’s article. Ahmed Al-Sarraf
