Sharia College… Who is responsible for the crisis? (2)

In the first article of this series, we paused to consider a question posed by the decline in acceptance rates at the College of Sharia: Why no longer does the student see in this major a clear future to the same extent as they do in other fields? Yet the next question is even more difficult: Who is responsible for the environment that has led the student to recalculate their options? It is not fair to place the entire burden on the state, nor is it fair to place it entirely on the college. If we are to read this crisis objectively, it is not created by a single party, but rather occurs at the intersection of three trajectories: public policy, the labor market, and the academic institution. From here begins a more equitable reading.

First: When university choice begins in the labor market

The university is not an isolated island from employment. The student choosing a major today thinks about the job they will seek tomorrow, and the doors their degree will open for them after four years or more. Therefore, any change in the conditions for entering professions and their pathways does not remain confined to regulations; its impact extends to the students’ own choices. Here, recent developments in the justice system become prominent. The new judicial organization has moved to restrict future appointments to judicial positions to those holding legal qualifications, while protecting existing legal positions. Similarly, the organization of the legal profession has moved to tighten the professional pathway linked to legal training. The intention here is not to object to the state’s right to regulate its professions, nor to the need for specialized legal training for those working in the justice system. Rather, the intention is to highlight another impact that decision-makers should not overlook: when professional pathways narrow for a university major, it inevitably affects the attractiveness of that major to the student. This is an educational and societal impact that deserves to be read within the full picture.

Second: Will the Sharia graduate become the Endowments graduate?

Here we reach a deeper problem than the job itself. If the mental image of the Sharia graduate is confined to imamate, preaching, guidance, and working in religious institutions, then we have reduced a broad field to a narrow circle. Sharia sciences are capable of intersecting with law, economics and Islamic finance, education, family, media, public policy, scientific research, technology ethics, and other fields. But the question is not: Can the Sharia graduate work in these fields? The more important question is: Have we prepared them for them? And have our academic institutions created clear pathways to lead them there? It is not enough to say that Sharia is suitable for these fields; the student must see this as a reality in the programs, courses, training, partnerships, and professional pathways.

Third: Here begins the college’s responsibility

It is easy for the college to say that the labor market has changed and that some job doors have closed. But the academic institution cannot stop at the level of complaint. A college that wants to attract high-achieving students is required to provide a convincing answer to the question of the future: What will I become after graduation? Here emerge questions that the college should ask itself, not as questions of accusation, but as questions of review and development: Have they developed their programs sufficiently? Do they periodically study the pathways of their graduates? Do they know the current and future needs of the labor market? Have they built effective partnerships with state institutions and the private sector? Do they provide students with applied skills alongside Sharia training? And can the student see more than one clear professional pathway before them? These are not questions against the college. They are questions for the sake of the college. Stagnation does not protect the major; rather, it may lead others to decide its future on its behalf.

Fourth: Neither the state alone is responsible… nor the college alone

Conversely, we cannot demand that the College of Sharia create a labor market on its own. The state shapes a large part of the professional environment, determines the conditions for entering professions, and organizes their pathways. If the state wants strong university majors, it must view its educational and professional decisions as a unified system, not as separate decisions. A decision regulating a profession may be correct from a professional perspective, but it simultaneously requires an assessment of its impact on education, on student choices, and on the future of the majors that fed that profession. Here, we do not need to exchange accusations, but rather to coordinate policies and anticipate the impacts of decisions before they turn into results that are difficult to remedy. Education does not exist in isolation from the labor market, the labor market does not exist in isolation from legislation, and legislation should not ignore its impact on the educational system.

Fifth: The most dangerous thing that can happen

The real danger is not the decline in acceptance alone. The danger is that a difficult-to-break cycle begins: narrowing of some professional pathways, a decline in the major’s attractiveness, a decrease in demand, a decrease in student numbers, talk about the college’s costs and its worth, and consideration of reducing programs or restructuring. At that point, we would have fallen into a dangerous paradox: we create the conditions that reduce demand for the college, then we turn around and hold the college accountable for the decline in demand. This is not a call to exempt the college from responsibility, but a call for accountability to be fair, and for causes to be read before results. If we want to treat the decline in demand, it is not enough to ask: Why did the number of students decrease? We must first ask: What made the student reconsider their choice?

Sixth: Merging… is it a solution?

When student numbers decline, talk of restructuring or merging emerges. But merging should not be the starting point; rather, it should be the result of an academic and professional study that answers a bigger question: Will merging make us more capable of graduating competencies that society needs? If merging will create stronger programs, expand opportunities for graduates, maintain scientific depth, and achieve real complementarity between majors, then it is an option worth studying. But if it turns into a mere response to numbers or costs, we are not treating the root of the problem, but merely managing its results. Major decisions regarding the future of the college should be built on a broader picture that includes student numbers, graduate pathways, labor market needs, program quality, education costs, and the future of the major, not on a single indicator, however important it may be.

And after we have identified the responsibility… what do we do?

If the responsibility is shared, then the solution must also be shared. The state is required to look at the impact of its professional decisions on the educational system. The university is required to link its programs to the changing needs of society. And the College of Sharia is required to redefine the horizons of its graduate, rather than being content with defending its traditional image. As for the student, we should not demand that they choose Sharia based solely on emotional motivation. Rather, we must provide them with convincing scientific and professional reasons that make them choose it with the confidence that the knowledge they receive today will be capable of building their future tomorrow. The requirement is not to keep the student in the College of Sharia by any means. The requirement is to make the College of Sharia a convincing option for the high-achieving student.

Here we arrive at the most difficult question in this series: If we do not want the College of Sharia to shrink, how do we rebuild it to become a college that the future needs? This is the question we will attempt to answer in the third article.

The Essence

1. The crisis of the College of Sharia is not the responsibility of a single party; it is the result of the interaction between public policy, the labor market, and the performance of the academic institution.

2. The organization of the judiciary and the legal profession is a professional and legislative matter, but its impact on the attractiveness of the Sharia major and student choices should be present in the discussion.

3. It is not permissible to reduce the Sharia graduate to traditional religious jobs, nor is it permissible for the college to wait for the state alone to open the doors of the future for them.

4. The state’s responsibility is to coordinate between its educational and professional policies, and the college’s responsibility is to develop its programs and outputs to be worthy of the new pathways.

5. The most dangerous thing that can happen is that we create the causes of declining demand, then turn to the college to hold it accountable for the result.

6. Merging is not a numerical or financial solution, but an academic option that is only acceptable if it will create stronger programs and a graduate more capable of serving society.

7. The goal is not to keep the student in the College of Sharia by any means, but to make it a convincing option for the student who is scientifically, professionally, and future-orientedly high-achieving.

Dr. Abdul Hamid Al-Shaigi