Washington and Tehran face a decision on the region's trajectory

Today, the confrontation between the United States and Iran is no longer merely an open crisis; it has reached a pivotal moment that could shape the region’s trajectory in the coming months. After months of pressure, san
Translated by Qiyas from القبس — Original source
Today, the confrontation between the United States and Iran is no longer merely an open crisis; it has reached a pivotal moment that could shape the region’s trajectory in the coming months. After months of pressure, sanctions, and military operations, escalation has returned to the forefront, while regional capitals, led by Doha and Islamabad, strive to keep the door to negotiation open. Notably, this latest escalation coincides with mediation efforts aimed at rebuilding the diplomatic track. Qatar has reaffirmed its ongoing cooperation with Pakistan and Oman to de-escalate tensions and bring both sides back to the negotiating table, while Islamabad maintains that a previous memorandum of understanding remains a viable framework to return to, provided suitable conditions are met. However, recent developments have made the path to a settlement more difficult. US reports have confirmed that American forces targeted three Iranian oil tankers, while Iran reported an attack on a tanker near Kharg Island, a development that heightens risk levels. Which path will the crisis take in the next three months?
Scenario One: Gradual Settlement. Despite all the escalation, the settlement scenario remains viable and may well be the most rational option for all parties. However, if it occurs, the settlement is unlikely to be a comprehensive agreement that resolves all files at once. More likely is a phased settlement starting with the most urgent issues, foremost among them navigation security in the Strait of Hormuz, before moving on to the nuclear file and sanctions. There is indeed a foundation to build upon. Last June, understandings were reached between Washington and Tehran that included a halt to military operations, arrangements for freedom of navigation, lifting the naval blockade, and opening the door to long-term negotiations. Furthermore, a political committee and technical groups had been formed to discuss nuclear issues, sanctions, monitoring mechanisms, and dispute resolution. This means that returning to negotiations does not necessarily require inventing a new track, but rather reviving a previously existing but collapsed negotiating framework. Crucially, both sides have an interest in such a settlement. Washington can claim that economic and military pressure forced Iran to make concessions, while Tehran can assert that it succeeded in preventing pressure from translating into regime change, securing in return eased sanctions and guarantees regarding navigation and the economy. In this light, the settlement becomes a face-saving exit for both sides. Therefore, the success of Qatar, Pakistan, and Oman in stabilizing this track will be the most significant indicator in the coming weeks. Qatar has explicitly stated that its priority is containing escalation and reopening the path for diplomacy, while Pakistan confirms its efforts continue despite the return of fighting.
Scenario Two: A Long War of Attrition. This is the scenario I consider most likely if mediation efforts fail to achieve a rapid breakthrough. In this case, Washington does not pursue a full-scale war, nor does Iran accept a final settlement; instead, the conflict continues in the gray zone. Limited US strikes, calculated Iranian responses, sanctions and economic blockades, pressure on oil exports, threats to navigation, all while backchannel communications persist. This scenario has already begun to take clear shape.
Scenario Three: Full-Scale Confrontation. This is the least likely scenario, but the most dangerous. The United States and Iran both understand that a full-scale war would be entirely different from limited strikes. Its repercussions would not be confined to Iran but could extend to the Strait of Hormuz, oil facilities, sea lanes, and Gulf states, with the possibility of other regional actors entering the confrontation.
I believe the next three months will be decisive and can be divided into three potential phases. The first is a test of mediation: Can Qatar, Pakistan, and Oman convince both sides to return to a negotiating format? Or will military escalation continue? Here, the Strait of Hormuz will be the first test. If no diplomatic breakthrough occurs, economic pressure on Iran will become more impactful. The United States is clearly betting that strangling oil exports will weaken Tehran’s ability to sustain the confrontation. Recent data indicates that Iranian oil exports have declined sharply in recent months. However, as economic pressure on Iran increases, so does its need to possess a strong bargaining chip. That chip may be Hormuz. This means that increased economic pressure could lead to two contradictory outcomes: either pushing Iran toward negotiation, or pushing it to raise the level of escalation. If diplomacy fails, the options become more difficult: a phased agreement that reopens the door to a broader settlement, continued long-term attrition, or new military escalation. The decisive factor then will be each side’s capacity to bear the cost of waiting. This is where the importance of mediation lies: a successful mediator does not convince both sides that one must back down, but rather convinces them that mutual concession is not defeat, but a necessary cost to prevent a greater one. Therefore, a settlement remains possible, but the window is narrowing.
Dr. Noura Saleh Al-Majim