Iran: Sweet Words and Harsh Attacks

The title of this article does not stem from a fleeting, unique experience that Kuwait underwent in the context of its relations with Iran, but rather from a long-standing observation that originated in the final years of the Shah’s rule. During the 1960s, manifestations of arrogance began to surface, coinciding perhaps with the beginning of the era of the late Sheikh Sabah Al-Salem, who assumed power and became the Emir of Kuwait in 1965, following the death of the late Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, the father of independence.

I still vividly recall the visit of the late Sheikh Sabah Al-Salem, Emir of the State of Kuwait, to Tehran in 1966. I was part of the Kuwaiti state delegation, accompanying Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who shared in that visit. I do not forget the dinner party hosted by the Shah in honor of the Kuwaiti Emir, attended by most of the leading figures in Iran, both civilian and military. I was struck by the presence of Iranian women in their finest attire, in an experience reminiscent of the banquets of the kings of France.

Crucially, during that visit, Sheikh Sabah Al-Salem succeeded in securing the Iranian Shah’s acceptance of the presence of the United Nations, and through it, to resolve the Iranian claim over Bahrain. Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, as Foreign Minister, followed up on the details in coordination with Iranian Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi, the son of the General who restored the Shah to power after successfully thwarting the coup aimed at removing him from power. Importantly, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad succeeded in building a friendship with the Iranian minister, Ardeshir Zahedi, characterized by a blend of trust, affection, and camaraderie. This facilitated the trajectory of relations as desired by Kuwaiti diplomacy, which earned trust as a partner in transcending the Bahrain issue.

Bilateral relations were distinguished by cooperation, a fact confirmed during the Shah’s visit to Kuwait in 1969. The Shah cooperated without hesitation, even up to the declaration of Bahrain’s independence. I observed the Shah’s interventions with fear that events might alter the regimes in the Gulf, while the Kuwaiti role strove to affirm the pillars of stability, leaving the Shah’s concerns intact.

Relations remained characterized by reassurance until the change of regime in Iran in 1979. The prominence of the clergy, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, emerged, assuming responsibility for governance and emphasizing priorities that affirmed a policy distinct from the Shah’s approach. This new direction sought to distance itself from the conflict of great powers and establish an independent approach characterized by commitment to Islamic principles and a departure from power diplomacy, adopting a path adorned with Islamic rhetoric.

Since the era of Khomeini, Iranian-Kuwaiti relations entered a new path dominated by caution, seeking to establish cooperation with religious bodies within Kuwaiti society to disseminate the principles it believes in, which form the philosophy the new regime wishes to spread. With these changes, Iranian-Kuwaiti relations entered a path that served the objectives of the Iranian Revolution, albeit with reservations that ended old trust. The approach of caution replaced it, restricting relations to a realistic, practical framework. Communication did not cease, and relations continued based on the calculus of interests and benefits, devoid of the affection born of trust, remaining confined to the circle of mutual benefits. Both sides accepted that geographical proximity imposes realities that cannot be ignored, acknowledging the existence of a group of Iranian citizens in Kuwait since the Shah’s era.

In truth, relations between Kuwait and Iran have remained within a fixed framework since the beginning of the Revolution. They have not expanded beyond the lines that reflect the reality of these relations, which are characterized by respect for the facts constituting the content of the file of relations between the two countries. These relations are not adorned with aesthetic vocabulary but translate the reality respected by both parties in preserving the logic of proximity and interests.

This understanding continued after the success of the Iranian Revolution, despite the shocks stemming from Iranian ambitions to expand its influence in the Gulf region. From this Iranian perspective, which denies the rights of partners and ignores the international dimension and the major interests of the world in the Gulf region, tension arises and international sensitivity increases due to fears of potential explosion in the region, and the destruction it could cause to the lives of peoples in most continents of the world.

The reality dominating the Gulf today has not emerged from rational calculations that could justify this crisis; rather, it is the product of an expansionist rationality that holds no respect for partnership rights and shows no enthusiasm for the sentiments of the Arab peoples of the Gulf. What adds to the astonishment is that Iran’s authority speaks with a tone of expansion at the expense of others, without regard for the rights of partners.

I witnessed Iranian diplomacy during the Shah’s era; it was eloquent in its vocabulary and understanding of partners’ propositions. Today, Iran lives under a different regime.

In conclusion, the Iranian approach that ignores the realities of the Gulf will lead to an increase in the American military presence. American practices to ensure stability and calm in the Gulf will intensify, all of this with collective global support aimed at preserving regional calm, as the absence of calm will harm everyone—near and far, the Persian side and the Arab side of the Gulf. The most important lesson from this crisis is for Iran to realize that those who possess the Gulf are Iran, the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, and Oman; that it is not Iranian land, but Arab and Persian. Will Iran accept this reality?

If Iran ignores this truth and turns its back on understanding a reality it is uncomfortable with, there is no escape from the crises that the future of the region carries. The reality of the Gulf will become a spot where the nature of the path resulting from this transformation cannot be predicted.

To avoid future crises, it is required that Iranian leadership understand that the Gulf is an international passage open to the global family, benefiting from its openness all parties in the global family. There is no alternative but for it to remain open to all and stable in a manner that secures the interests of all parties in the global family. This is a collective message to Iranian leadership to respect its contents.

Abdullah Basharah