New America in the Region
Foreign Affairs, a highly respected journal, published a lengthy article a few days ago titled “The End of the American Middle East, Iran, and the Last Gasps of a Failed Regime,” by Mark Lynch. We excerpt the following key paragraphs, with modifications:
The era of the American Middle East is over. The regional order that had dominated since 1991 has become one of the casualties of the American-Israeli war with Iran. It has proven the failure of the United States and Israel to dislodge the regime in Tehran, as well as the failure and bankruptcy of decades of sanctions and violence. The United States’ inability to protect its Gulf allies from Iranian attacks, or to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, has seriously undermined the foundational security agreement that justified its network of military bases in the region. Furthermore, Israel’s escalating threats and its abandonment of any pretense of interest in reaching a settlement with the Palestinians have ended Washington’s decades-long mission to unite its Arab allies and Israel in a permanent security partnership.
President Trump’s strategic war in the region has brought American policy to its logical conclusion, but the old order is, in fact, making way for a new one. Today, the Suez Crisis of 1956 is remembered as the last gasp of British imperial influence in the Middle East, but it took years to reach that inevitable end. American dominance will not vanish overnight, but long-standing doubts about American power and objectives have reached a peak. The realities of the Iranian war and the Israeli war on Gaza have already altered the calculations of both U.S. allies and adversaries, and another round of fighting or the election of a new American president will not heal the rift.
The coming years promise further discord. Israel and Iran share a common interest in keeping the Middle East in a state of chaos and violence, and the United States has little leverage to restrain either. Israel hopes to expand its actual borders, including annexing as much of historic Palestine as possible, and to impose its control by force over vast areas of the region. Assuming the Iranian regime does not collapse soon—an unlikely scenario—Tehran, emboldened, will seek to defend and expand its regional influence by drawing Washington into endless, boundless “gray zone” conflicts, in which it has long thrived. However, conditions are not ideal. Most regional leaders yearn for a respite from military strikes and economic turmoil, yet they are deeply resentful of Washington for dragging them into this disaster.
However, abandoning the policy of supporting regional states, letting allies off the hook, and militarily containing adversaries could enable the United States to engage with the region in a healthier manner, one that might ultimately lead to the lasting stability Washington has long claimed to seek. The article is worth revisiting for those interested.
Ahmed Al-Sarraf
