A Reading of the Mecca Agreement
The Jeddah Agreement on Joint Defense between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan arrives within a regional context witnessing a reshaping of power balances and alliances. Its significance stems from the convergence of three countries possessing substantial political, geographic, and military weight, thereby enhancing defensive coordination among them and boosting their capacity to address shared security challenges. However, reading the agreement gains a broader dimension when linked to shifts in Turkish-Israeli relations, particularly amid rapid developments in Syria.
Official relations between Turkey and Israel date back to March 28, 1949, when Ankara recognized Israel, followed by the opening of its diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv in January 1950. Over the ensuing decades, relations experienced varied phases. After periods of stagnation, the 1990s saw broad political, security, and military convergence, coinciding with regional transformations following the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords. Cooperation was not confined to the political and security spheres; it extended to economics and trade. Bilateral trade volume reached approximately $5.36 billion in 2014, comprising $2.75 billion in Turkish exports to Israel and $2.68 billion in imports from it. Turkish exports included automobiles and spare parts, iron and steel, electrical equipment, and plastics, while imports consisted of fuel and its derivatives, plastic products, machinery, and equipment.
However, this trajectory underwent sharp transformations, most notably the “Mavi Marmara” incident in 2010, which led to a downgrade in relations and the suspension of military cooperation. Subsequent attempts at normalization reflected the pragmatic nature of the relationship and its susceptibility to shifting between cooperation and discord depending on political and security conditions. In recent years, the Palestinian issue and Syrian developments have become prominent sources of tension. The Israeli attack on the Abu al-Dhaher airbase in Syria on August 18, 2026, added a new factor to this equation. Israel targeted the base with eight airstrikes. Turkey condemned the attack, while Israel justified its action based on concerns regarding the potential presence of Turkish forces at the site—claims denied by both Ankara and Damascus.
The Abu al-Dhaher incident reveals that Syria has become a primary arena for intersecting Turkish and Israeli interests. Turkey seeks to support Syria’s stability and enhance cooperation with its government, whereas Israel views any expansion of the Turkish role within the Syrian theater with sensitivity. These developments have prompted the United States to attempt establishing a mechanism to prevent friction and miscalculation among Turkey, Israel, and Syria.
From this perspective, the Jeddah Agreement can be understood as part of a regional environment moving toward strengthening indigenous capabilities and coordination among regional powers. This does not imply that the agreement is directed against Israel; rather, Turkey’s participation adds a new element to regional balance calculations, particularly given the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations and increasing competition over Syria.
Strategically, the relationship between Ankara and Tel Aviv will remain governed by a mix of competition and mutual interests. History has proven that economic interests do not preclude political disputes, nor do disputes necessarily lead to permanent confrontation. Consequently, the future of the relationship will largely depend on developments regarding the Syrian file and the Palestinian issue, as well as both sides’ ability to manage friction zones.
Thus, reading the Jeddah Agreement extends beyond its defensive text to encompass broader transformations in the regional order. Turkey, whose relationship with Israel has shifted from recognition and cooperation to tension and competition, is currently expanding its strategic options. If institutionalized, the Jeddah Agreement could become one of the tools of this transformation, not necessarily evolving into a focal point of confrontation with Israel, but rather serving as a framework to enhance regional deterrence capacity and protect shared interests.
Dr. Abdulmuhsin Ahmed Al-Anjari
