The government's departure on the night of the invasion and Al-Nafisi's remarks

In an interview with Al-Soud Al-Aswad, Abdullah Al-Nefisi stated that the government’s departure from Kuwait on the first day of the invasion, coupled with its call for citizens to resist via a temporary radio station mounted on a “Vanet” vehicle, amounted to a form of “recklessness” and “foolhardiness.”

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Al-Nefisi’s remarks constituted a clear distortion of logic and historical events. The government’s exit on the first day of the invasion was viewed as a crushing personal defeat for Saddam Hussein and his first fatal mistake. In this context, every defeat on one side represents a victory on the other. The departure was not merely to preserve lives, but to safeguard the legitimacy of the rule, the continuity of leadership, and its fitness to act on behalf of the nation, thereby conferring the necessary legitimacy on the decisions regarding liberation.

Historically, many military withdrawals from the battlefield have turned into victories. Among the most famous is the evacuation from Dunkirk at the outset of World War II, which saved 338,000 British, French, and Belgian soldiers from certain death at the hands of German forces. That withdrawal constituted a victory and enabled Britain to continue the war. Similarly, George Washington’s army’s nighttime retreat across the East River from Brooklyn in 1776, before it could be besieged, was considered a major victory during a critical phase of the American Revolution against the British.

History proudly records numerous other withdrawals, including the Battle of Chosin Reservoir during the Korean War in 1950, carried out by United Nations forces. From ancient history, there is the Byzantine withdrawal from the Battle of Manzikert in 1071. There was also the withdrawal of Khalid ibn al-Walid from the Battle of Mu’tah in 629 CE, after his three commanders were killed and Byzantine forces and their allies gained the upper hand; this withdrawal allowed him to reorganize the army and extricate it from annihilation. Another example is the Russian retreat before Napoleon in 1812, which succeeded in wearing down the French army. Additionally, the Soviet withdrawal from parts of the Eastern Front in 1941, in the face of the German advance, proved strategic.

These organized withdrawals helped buy time, adopt new policies, and, crucially, save the main force from encirclement or annihilation while preserving leadership and morale. They also bought time to call for reinforcements, establish new defenses, and retain the capacity to wage future political or military battles.

Furthermore, there are famous instances of political leaders leaving their countries after invasion, with their departure helping to preserve legitimacy and facilitate the recapture of the occupied homeland. A close example is Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait 36 years ago, where the legitimate government’s successful refuge in Saudi Arabia preserved international recognition and legal representation, thereby granting the coalition forces the necessary legitimacy to militarily reclaim the country.

After France fell to Germany in 1940, General de Gaulle fled to Britain, declaring the continuation of the fight and leading “Free France.” When Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, Emperor Haile Selassie went into exile and continued to demand his country’s independence before the League of Nations. Following Germany’s invasion of the Netherlands in 1940, Queen Wilhelmina and the Dutch government fled to Britain. From there, they continued issuing statements, supported the Dutch resistance, and backed forces fighting alongside the Allies. The same occurred simultaneously with Norway, when King Haakon rejected the German-appointed government and fled to Britain as a refugee. This pattern repeated after Germany’s invasion and partition of Yugoslavia. Similarly, the King of Greece and his government fled to Egypt and then to Britain in 1941, continuing to support the resistance and its eventual victory.

For all these reasons, the Kuwaiti government’s departure for Saudi Arabia on the night of the invasion was considered a brilliant tactical victory. Had it not occurred, the same critics would likely have blamed the government for failing to leave.

Ahmed Al-Sarraf