The Political System in Syria: Visions and Ambitions (2 - 2)
We are currently, as we attempt to predict Syria’s future, akin to someone who woke up the morning after the announcement of the 1954 Syrian election results. Extrapolating a future vision is far more difficult than historical analysis and questioning the future of the current regime, which came to power on December 8, 2024. However, it can be firmly stated that under no circumstances will it be able to monopolize power in the manner and style achieved by the Assad regime. There is no doubt that the priorities of the new Republic, led by al-Sharaa, center on achieving territorial unity and spreading security throughout Syria. The new regime has accomplished this, quelling unrest in the coastal region and securing a major victory through its agreement with the Kurds. As for the issue of allowing Suwayda to remain under Israeli protection, time will resolve it. The new Republic is not in a position to confront the Israeli military machine.
When we attempt to predict a new future for Syria, we mean bringing about a change in the structure of the current power, which is composed of leaders from outside the major cities: Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Latakia. President al-Sharaa, although he grew up in the Levant or Damascus, is not considered a Levantine by the people of the Levant or Damascus. Similarly, Interior Minister Anas al-Khatib is from the Qalamoun region, part of the Damascus countryside. Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaybani is from Al-Hasakah, Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasrah is from the Hama countryside, and even Issam al-Khalif, recently appointed as President of the Constitutional Court, is from the Hama countryside—a appointment that surprised many observers.
Perhaps the most significant common factor among the pillars of the new Syrian regime is that they were born in the 1980s; they belong to the generation that participated in the fighting during the Syrian Revolution against the Assad regime. Less than two years after the fall of the Assad regime, this appears to be acceptable, and perhaps even welcomed. Security and regime stability require reliance on figures with a militant history. The urban elite, even those who participated in the revolution, lack a combat history in Iraq, and many have emigrated to Europe, where they still reside.
When discussing the political future of Syria’s governance, we are asking whether there will truly be free elections and effective political participation from outside Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. This is while acknowledging that the Syrian people’s primary concerns focus on improving their economic conditions. During my recent visit, about a month ago, I observed that inflation rates are high, reaching painful levels; electricity prices have risen more than fivefold. The choice should not be between improving the economic situation and political participation. Syria’s political future depends heavily on its economic standing. It is true that the terrorism of the previous regime has ended, and there is a decent level of freedom, but people also aspire to live in economic stability and with dignity. The political and economic situation depends greatly on the support provided by Gulf states. This support will not come merely through aid, but by opening the door to economic partnerships in which Gulf states invest in rebuilding Syria.
I met many young Syrians in the United States and Europe who are planning to return to Syria. Despite achieving academic and economic distinction in their host countries, these individuals also belong to the 1980s generation that currently controls the levers of power. However, their culture and life experiences differ entirely from those of the pillars of the current regime. The political process can accommodate the views and proposals of all parties. The generation that spent a significant part of its life in Europe will add much to Syria scientifically and economically. Relying on leaders who derived their authority from the administration of Idlib province before December 8, 2024, is acceptable for a transitional period, but governing Syria and securing its future require comprehensive and diverse Syrian expertise.
Syria suffers from dilapidated infrastructure and a poor educational system; universities lack the capacity to accommodate more than half of the student population. It must also be noted that the civilian elites in Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and especially Damascus, feel alienated or unrepresented within the current state leadership. Everyone is happy to have rid themselves of a dictatorial regime that monopolized power for over half a century, yet at the same time, they aspire to a more modern Syrian model.
Dr. Hamed Al-Hamoud
