The Gulf: Between Repositioning and the Necessity of a 'State of Unity'

In a fleeting moment in the course of events, and on a matter of profound importance concerning the fate of our present and future, deep and explicit reflection becomes a necessity, not an option. There is an issue that demands we open the doors of thought to it loudly, before facts close off the avenues of decision-making. And because this is a critical and existential matter, thinking must be loud and strong in this instance. Amid the rapid changes sweeping the Middle East, the Gulf region is no longer merely a theater through which events pass; it has become the heart and balance of the equation. The US-Iran memorandum of understanding, signed and ended before its ink had dried, is not a transient diplomatic event, but a declaration of the beginning of a new phase that redefines the concept of “guarantees,” upon which the Gulf has relied for decades. Here, thinking loudly becomes a strategic necessity, not an intellectual luxury. The question is no longer: What will America or Iran do? Rather, we, in the Gulf Arab states, where are we taking ourselves? And what form of guarantees do we desire for our security?

Gulf security is not an end in itself; it is the gateway to development and prosperity for our states and peoples, and a gateway to a life that our peoples constantly aspire to—stable, far from the language of conflicts and destructive wars. Therefore, any discussion about memorandums and agreements of understanding must begin with a fundamental question: How do we ensure that the future is primarily Gulf-centric? And how do we transform a moment of regional anxiety into a moment of establishing a “state of union,” placing the interests of Gulf peoples above all else, and making defensive, political, and economic integration a shield that protects development, rather than a wall that besieges it?

The US-Iran memorandum of understanding, which was signed but not implemented due to the Iranians’ customary failure to honor their commitments, represented theoretically a turning point in the regional security equation in the Middle East. It does not stop at the nuclear file or sanctions; it directly touches the structure of political, security, and strategic balances in the Arab Gulf. Since the Arab Gulf is the primary and final arena of influence for any understanding between Washington and Tehran, the question arises: How do the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states interpret these memorandums and agreements? There is a state of tension and distrust toward the Iranian system, given its policy of expansion and export of the revolution, which has dominated the Iranian system’s discourse since 1979. Has the time come to move from a “Cooperation Council” to a “state of union” to confront changes that do not tolerate fragmentation?

There are political, security, and strategic dimensions to these memorandums and agreements. Politically, the dimension involves managing competition rather than resolving it. By its logic, the memorandum signifies Washington’s shift from a policy of “maximum pressure” to a policy of “negotiated containment.” This transition carries two messages: the first to Iran, implying implicit recognition of its regional role in exchange for curbing its nuclear and missile programs; and the second to the Gulf, indicating that Gulf security is no longer automatically guaranteed by absolute American assurance, but has become part of a broader geopolitical exchange. Politically, this weakens the logic of “security dependence” and strengthens the logic of “alliance pluralism,” meaning Gulf states will be compelled to deal with Iran as a recognized party in the equation.

There is also the security dimension, shifting from proxy deterrence to self-deterrence. An understanding that reduces the intensity of direct confrontation between the US and Iran may lower the probability of a “proxy war” in the Gulf in the short term, but it simultaneously raises the expectations placed on the GCC states themselves. There is also a reduction in the US margin of maneuver; any new American commitment will be conditional and less engaged, as evident in files concerning missiles, drones, and militias. In the strategic dimension, the redrawing of alliance maps becomes clear. Strategically, the memorandum means that America wants to “separate theaters,” calming relations with Iran in the Gulf in exchange for focusing on China, Russia, and Ukraine. This pushes Gulf states toward diversifying partnerships, if possible, with China, Russia, Europe, and India.

Here, we employ the phrase “thinking loudly” to highlight the state of reliance on self-capabilities in air defense, naval forces, space, and military artificial intelligence. This leads us to potential implications for Gulf security, such as the security of the Strait of Hormuz and supply chains. Any fragile understanding prone to collapse will keep tension in the strait as a tool for Iranian blackmail and pressure. Iran implements its policy of imposing facts on the ground to control the Strait of Hormuz, contrary to international law. It executes this policy of “imposing facts on the ground” in the Strait through a military strategy known as “denial of access.” If it cannot achieve complete control over the passage, it makes transit costly and dangerous, demonstrating power and exerting influence in one of the world’s most important maritime corridors through economic and legal blackmail.

From this, we arrive at an important issue in the Gulf dimension: internal and societal security. Any sectarian or media escalation by Iran’s proxies, exploiting the understanding, will require a unified and strong Gulf discourse that distinguishes between “political coexistence” and “security concession.” This is a crucial and fundamental issue in maintaining cohesion among our Gulf peoples, especially as they face storms.

Now, what can the GCC states do? The challenge is managed through a proactive Gulf project based on several tracks: a unified military defense track under a unified Gulf military command; a proactive political and diplomatic track with a unified political stance and discourse; an economic and technological track, such as a complete common Gulf market, a unified currency, and a unified customs union. Soft power must also play a role through a media and cultural track and a single Gulf discourse addressing public opinion.

We now come to the most important issue in posing the question loudly and explicitly: From “Cooperation Council” to “state of union”—is the time ripe? Is the Council system capable of formulating a “vision for future pathways”? Why a “state of union” now? Forty-five years ago, the leaders of the Gulf Arab states laid the foundation for building a Gulf entity, launched with the consensus of the leaderships and peoples of six Gulf states that established the Gulf Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States. Its strong basis laid the groundwork for the first phase of launch as a Cooperation Council, leading to a state of union. Undoubtedly, the 2030 visions have created an integrated political, economic, and social structure ready for political and security integration, to later become the nucleus of a “state of union”—a mandatory security and defense union, while preserving the political sovereignty of each state—a “Gulf NATO” model.

The transition from cooperation to union reflects a deep political will and translates the aspirations of the region’s peoples for prosperity and stability. One of the most prominent advantages of union is enhancing political and security deterrence, providing a stronger framework for making unified and effective decisions in the face of threats, reducing intra-regional disputes, and increasing the global stature of the Gulf position. The peoples of the Arab Gulf are fully convinced of the will of our leaderships, the courage of their response to changes, and the conscious popular participation in supporting the transition and achieving cohesion. Moreover, practical initiatives to enhance unity, such as developing joint Gulf institutions and expanding rights for Gulf citizens, contribute to consolidating the foundations of union.

After 45 years since the establishment of the Council, the transition from a state of cooperation to a state of union remains a necessity required by the future. It is not a leisurely option, but a practical and strategic response to the challenges and obligations imposed by reality. US-Iran memorandums and agreements are not the end of the story, but the beginning of a “post-guarantee” phase. In front of the GCC states lies the task of shaping the future and leaping to a “state of union” with strategic awareness, transforming threats into opportunities to build a Gulf system that is the strongest in the region’s history.

Achieving a state of union is a necessity for a better future for the states and peoples of the Gulf. It reflects a deep aspiration toward a more stable and robust future for the states and peoples of the region. The idea of transitioning from cooperation to union is not merely a political step, but a civilizational project that opens the door to economic, security, and cultural integration, placing the Gulf in a more influential position on the international stage. Union is not a luxury; it is a necessity for a better future. I believe that union is not a choice among several alternatives, but the only option to ensure that the Gulf is a key player in the 21st century, not merely a theater affected by decisions made by others. History does not wait, and the security of the Gulf today is written by Gulf pens… not dictated from outside.

Nabil bin Yaqoub Al-Humaid