Secret Report from the Heart of the Iranian Regime: Confessions Unheard in Public
Reports written behind closed doors are not the same as statements delivered in front of cameras. While official speeches are crafted to persuade public opinion, secret reports are typically written to diagnose reality as it is, free from propaganda considerations. From this perspective, the document, recently leaked by IranWire, acquires exceptional significance. It does not represent the opinion of the opposition or a study by an independent research center; rather, it is a report prepared by Ali Rabiei, the Iranian President’s Advisor for Social Affairs. Rabiei is a senior official who previously held high-ranking security and political positions, including Minister of Labor and Government Spokesman, in addition to his background in the Ministry of Intelligence.
The report’s importance lies in revealing what the regime tells itself when the public is absent. The figures it contains paint a picture radically different from the official narrative regarding the cohesion of Iranian society and its unity around the authorities. According to the survey upon which the report is based, approximately 90% of Iranians wish to change the country’s conditions, compared to only about 9% who support maintaining the status quo.
The issue extends beyond political discontent, encompassing a characterization of Iranian society as one of the angriest in the world, with levels of anger that, according to the report, exceed those of societies that endured long years of civil war, such as Afghanistan and Chad. The report also documents a widespread deterioration in the psychological state of society, with feelings of despair, depression, and fear becoming prevalent, particularly among youth and the educated—groups that are supposed to represent the foundation of any nation’s future.
Furthermore, the report reveals a significant shift in Iranian awareness, as many distinguish between the homeland and the political system. The desire to defend Iran against external aggression does not necessarily imply support for the ruling authority. This distinction reflects a clear rise in national identity alongside a decline in commitment to religious ideology, a trend confirmed by several social indicators, including a sharp drop in the proportion of young generations adhering to religious rituals compared to previous decades.
The phenomenon of brain drain is no less alarming than the aforementioned indicators. The report notes that nearly half of educated youth and university graduates aspire to leave the country. This is not merely a sign of an economic crisis but also reflects declining confidence in the future and a growing sense of blocked horizons.
However, the most striking paradox lies not in the diagnosis of the crisis, but in the way the report proposes addressing it. Despite acknowledging the widespread nature of public discontent, it does not call for political reforms or a review of public policies. Instead, it recommends improving media discourse, strengthening the narrative that blames external sanctions for the crisis, and continuing government support while avoiding direct confrontation with society. In other words, the report suggests managing anger rather than addressing its root causes.
Iranian sociologist Saeed Beyvandani goes further, arguing that the results presented in the report may understate reality, as participants in government surveys often hesitate to fully express their opinions for fear of security repercussions.
It is impossible to predict with certainty how conditions in Iran will evolve in the coming years. However, historical lessons suggest that major transformations rarely begin with a single event, but rather with the accumulation of economic, social, and political crises, through which the state gradually loses its ability to generate legitimacy and trust. When the economy weakens, public confidence erodes, talent emigrates, and ideology loses its persuasive power, the regime enters a phase where the future is open to multiple possibilities.
Perhaps the true value of this report lies not merely in its status as a leaked document, but in its representation of a rare internal acknowledgment of the magnitude of the crisis facing Iran. How this crisis will be handled—whether it will be managed or resolved—remains the most important question, to be answered by the coming years.
Dr. Mohammed Al-Wahayb
