The Political System in Syria: Visions and Ambitions (1 - 2)
The Syrian People’s Council held its inaugural session on July 12, electing Abdulhamid Al-Awak as its president, and Mustafa Musa and Madouna Bashar as its deputies. The Council comprises 210 members, 70 of whom were appointed by President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, while the remaining 140 were elected. The election was conducted by an electoral college consisting of 50 members, each tasked with selecting one council member. In reality, this electoral college mechanism represents an innovative attempt to blend genuine electoral processes with appointments, given that the current conditions in Syria—particularly regarding citizens’ official records and places of residence—make it difficult to accurately enumerate the electorate at present. While not ideal, this approach is understandable under Syria’s current circumstances.
The most pressing question remains: Will there be genuine parliamentary elections after the five-year transitional period, approximately two years of which will have elapsed by December next year? Undoubtedly, predicting the future of Syria or its political system is no easy task. It hinges largely on the conviction of the Syrian leadership, embodied by President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, that despite the sacrifices and heroism demonstrated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in toppling the dictatorial regime, the Syrian people aspire to see a political leadership more representative of the country’s political, sectarian, religious, and ethnic diversities.
Syria’s political future is not shaped solely by internal dynamics; an international environment also plays a significant role in determining its trajectory. Forecasting the future is far more challenging than historical analysis. The future is subject to variables, most of which lie beyond human control, whereas history involves the logical analysis of a completed historical phase. However, one lesson can be drawn from this historical analysis, exemplified by examining the historical experience of the Baath Party’s decline.
The Baath Party was founded by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar in 1947 as a civilian party that contributed to democratic political activism. In 1954, 17 of its candidates were elected to the Syrian Parliament, forming the second-largest parliamentary bloc. It appeared the party had a genuine electoral base. However, the spread of its ideas among military officers, particularly those from minority backgrounds within the army, deprived the party of the natural maturation and growth of its ideology among the broader populace. Consequently, the party seized power through a military coup on March 8, 1963, appointing military officer Amin al-Hafiz as President of the Republic. This marked the beginning of a series of coups and assassinations, culminating in Hafez al-Assad’s seizure of power in late 1970. He then established a personal dictatorship in early 1971, ruling until his death in 2000, after which power was inherited by his son, who fled to Moscow on December 8, 2024.
To illustrate the contrast between future forecasting and historical analysis, let us return to that day in 1954 when the results of the Syrian parliamentary elections were announced, revealing that the Baath Party had won 17 seats. On that day, one might have questioned Syria’s political future. Would anyone have predicted the March 8, 1963 coup, the party’s subsequent monopoly on power, and the internal conspiracies, betrayals, and purges among its leadership? Certainly not. There is a significant difference between the mechanisms and social conditions that transformed the Baath Party from an elite-oriented party in 1954 into a factionalized party fighting for power by 1963. Historical analysis becomes more accurate as we approach 1966, after Salah Jadid and Hafez al-Assad consolidated power, and even more precise by the late 1970s, after Hafez al-Assad established his sole rule.
Today, we can more accurately analyze the social and historical factors that transformed the Baath Party from an elite party whose members successfully won 17 parliamentary seats into an authoritarian party whose members conspired against one another, converting instability during the 1963–1970 period into a so-called “stability” during the 1970–2024 period. This was achieved through layers of intelligence agencies and a climate of terror that spread throughout the country, to the extent that fathers feared even asking about their sons’ fates. Was it naive to expect the party to continue its democratic trajectory, which began in 1954? Obviously not. However, as previously noted, future forecasting is far more difficult than historical analysis. Who could have anticipated the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in late 2024? Bashar al-Assad was on track to achieve renewed international acceptance, with Gulf states beginning to accommodate him and invite him to conferences. His regime’s fall came as a surprise even to Israeli intelligence.
On July 13, 2024, the newspaper Haaretz published a report outlining a plan to overthrow the Iranian regime by deploying a Kurdish corps of 16,000 fighters in the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran. The report noted that after being caught off guard by the fall of Assad on December 8, 2024, at the hands of a limited-capability force such as HTS’s army, Netanyahu believed the Kurdish corps could have accomplished the mission and successfully toppled the Iranian regime. However, the report mocked Netanyahu, pointing out the significant differences between Iran and Syria. The latter relied entirely on Russia for arms, whereas Iran had been supplying drones and missiles to Russia. The report further stated that the plan to deploy the Kurds in the battle was rejected by the Americans at the last minute.
The rapid fall of the Assad regime came as a surprise to most international intelligence agencies familiar with the region.
Dr. Hamed Al-Hamoud
