Is Iran a normal state?
In modern political thought, the state is no longer defined as a religious message or a border-crossing revolutionary movement, but rather as a political and legal institution whose primary goal is to protect society, preserve sovereignty, and advance the interests of its citizens. From this perspective, a state’s strength is measured by the security, stability, and prosperity it provides its people, not by the number of fronts it manages or the conflicts it engages in beyond its borders. Hence emerged the concept of the “natural state,” meaning a state that makes national interest the benchmark for its domestic and foreign policies, and interacts with the world through the logic of politics rather than the logic of ideological mission. This concept does not refer to an ideal state, but to one that acts according to the norms established by the modern international system, where serving the citizen is the ultimate goal, and instruments of power serve the state, not the other way around.
This is likely what prompted Henry Kissinger to say that Iran must make a choice: Is it a state or a cause? Or, as Zbigniew Brzezinski observed, the problem lies not in Iran’s strength, but in the nature of the system that governs it. The world deals with numerous nuclear-armed states without viewing them as perpetual sources of concern, because their behavior is ultimately governed by considerations of national interest. However, when power is coupled with an ideological project that transcends state boundaries, traditional political calculations become more complex, and political behavior becomes less predictable.
After the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran chose to link its political identity to a revolutionary project that extended beyond its national borders, making the principle of “exporting the revolution” part of its official discourse and regional policy. Foreign policy was no longer managed solely through the logic of the nation-state; instead, national interest considerations became intertwined with ideological commitments, blurring the boundaries between the state and the project.
Yet this model drew criticism not only from abroad but also sparked extensive debate within Iran itself. Among the most prominent voices in this context was Iranian political science professor Saeed Vaezpour, who called for redefining the function of the state, asking: What benefit has the Iranian citizen derived from spending resources on conflicts beyond the borders, while the domestic sphere suffers from inflation, currency depreciation, unemployment, and economic crises? Vaezpour was not advocating for weakening Iran or abandoning its interests, but rather raising a question about state priorities. In his view, a state’s strength is not measured by the number of regional dossiers it manages, but by its ability to build a robust economy, advanced universities, efficient institutions, and a decent standard of living for its citizens. A state that burdens itself with the weight of a perpetual ideological project may eventually find that the cost of that project exceeds its capacity to sustain it.
The importance of this debate lies in revealing that the disagreement over Iran’s role is not merely a dispute between Iran and its neighbors, but also an internal discussion about the meaning and function of the state. Has the state been created to serve its citizens, or to carry a project that transcends its borders? Does its legitimacy derive from the welfare of its people, or from the expansion of its influence? The answer to this question will not only determine Iran’s future, but will also largely shape the future of security and stability in the Gulf and the Middle East.
Dr. Mohammed Al-Wahab
