A New Yalta: Will Trump and Putin Redraw Europe's Map?
Trump and Kushner's statements regarding an agreement with Russia have raised European fears of a repeat of the Yalta scenario and the marginalization of the continent.
Translated by Alqyas from Al-Nahar — Original source
Are we witnessing an attempt to reproduce the Yalta Conference, but in a new format, in a world where the balance of power is no longer what it once was? This question arises forcefully in light of Donald Trump’s statements regarding a “very big” deal with Russia, which could extend beyond the war in Ukraine to encompass all of Europe, sparking firm European rejection of any security arrangements made without the continent’s participation. The notion of “Yalta 2” implies an effort to reach an American-Russian understanding that would redraw the rules of European security and spheres of influence, akin to the 1945 Yalta Conference, where the victorious powers outlined the contours of the international order and the fates of numerous countries. However, the fundamental difference is that today’s world is not the world of the original Yalta, and Europe is no longer merely a geographical space to be negotiated among great powers. When Trump speaks of a “big and beautiful” deal encompassing all of Europe, he opens the door to questions that go beyond merely ending the war in Ukraine. Is Washington seeking a comprehensive settlement with Moscow, including understandings on troop deployments, the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), security guarantees, and the limits of Russian influence in Eastern Europe?
Trump’s statements, alongside those of his envoy Jared Kushner regarding work on a broader European security framework, reflect an American trend toward linking the end of the Ukrainian war with a reordering of relations with Russia. Here lies the danger: what Washington may view as an opportunity for a historic diplomatic achievement, Europe may see as an attempt to reshape its strategic security according to bilateral understandings over which it has no control. Since before its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has demanded wide-ranging changes to the European security architecture, including restrictions on NATO’s expansion and the withdrawal of its forces from countries that joined the alliance after 1997. These demands were rejected by the West at the time, which affirmed that sovereign states have the right to choose their security alliances. Today, these demands appear to be back on the negotiating table, but through the gateway of a political settlement to the war.
The European response has been clear, and perhaps sharper than Washington anticipated. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas affirmed that Europe already has an existing security structure and that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not have veto power over the continent’s security. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski stated that any arrangement concerning the future of Ukraine and Europe made over the heads of Europeans would be politically unacceptable and practically impossible. These positions reveal a significant shift in the nature of European objections. The issue is no longer just about the necessity of involving Europeans in peace negotiations, but about rejecting the principle that the continent should become a playground for understandings between Washington and Moscow. European concerns extend beyond Ukraine’s fate to include the future of NATO, the US military presence in Europe, the security of the Baltic states and Poland, as well as the possibility of entrenching new Russian spheres of influence. Europe’s stance reflects an awareness that any settlement granting Moscow strategic gains in exchange for ending the war, without guarantees preventing recurrence, could open the door to new crises rather than resolve the current one. Peace imposed by the balance of power may halt fighting temporarily, but it does not ensure stability.
American-Russian moves cannot be read in isolation from broader transformations in the international system. Trump, who bets on direct diplomacy and grand deals, may see an understanding with Putin as a means to reorder American priorities, reduce the cost of engagement in Europe, and focus on competing with China.
In response, Putin seeks to consolidate Russia’s gains in Ukraine and restore international recognition of Moscow as an indispensable major power in shaping the European security architecture. From this perspective, both sides may find a common interest in a settlement that extends beyond Ukraine. However, this shared interest does not necessarily imply aligned objectives: Washington aims to end a costly war and redistribute its strategic burdens, while Moscow seeks to reshape the security order established after the Cold War and curtail Western influence near its borders. The question here is: Can Washington make strategic concessions to Moscow without undermining the credibility of its alliances? And can Russia obtain security guarantees without those guarantees becoming constraints on the sovereignty of European states? This is an exceedingly complex equation, making talk of a “grand bargain” far easier than its realization. The anticipated Abu Dhabi negotiations assume exceptional importance, not only as a new milestone in the process of ending the war in Ukraine, but also as a test of whether Washington seeks a limited settlement of the conflict or a broader understanding that would reshape security relations between Russia and the West. Fundamental positions remain widely divergent. Ukraine demands reliable guarantees to prevent a recurrence of Russian aggression, while Moscow seeks constraints on NATO’s military role in Eastern Europe. Europeans, for their part, insist on their right to direct participation in any arrangements affecting their security. Consequently, the success of the negotiations will depend not only on Trump and Putin’s ability to reach an understanding, but also on the feasibility of implementing that understanding and its acceptance by the relevant parties. The invocation of Yalta raises concerns about a return to spheres-of-influence logic, the erosion of national sovereignty norms, and the marginalization of smaller states in the face of great-power deals. Yet there are fundamental differences that prevent a literal repetition of that historical scenario. Today’s Europe possesses robust political, economic, and security institutions, and its countries are not mere appendages implementing Washington’s decisions. Ukraine, despite the conditions of war, refuses to have its future treated as a bargaining chip among great powers. Moreover, the international system is no longer bipolar, as during the Cold War, but has become more multipolar and complex, with the rise of China and the growing roles of regional powers. Europe does not reject negotiations with Russia, nor does it oppose ending the war in Ukraine; it rejects a peace that comes at the expense of undermining its security or infringing on the sovereignty of states. This is a core principle that cannot be bypassed in any sustainable settlement. Ultimately, Trump and Putin may achieve a historic understanding, but they cannot close the file on European security on their own, because Europe has become an indispensable stakeholder. The question then becomes whether the world is moving toward a settlement that rebuilds collective security, or toward a grand bargain that redistributes spheres of influence and postpones future conflicts rather than resolving them. History does not necessarily repeat itself, but it warns us that peace imposed over the heads of peoples may contain within it the seeds of the next war.