The Gulf Cooperation Council: The Absent Power

In the previous article, we discussed the Iranian regime’s intentions and its aspirations for regional hegemony, as well as its vision of relations with neighboring states, which are based on subordination rather than partnership. Dealing with these aspirations cannot be achieved by yielding to them, given that such submission poses a threat to the independence of the region’s states, nor by rashly engaging in a destructive military confrontation that would devastate everything. Rather, it requires building a regional deterrent force capable of curbing expansionist ambitions and halting interference. Can the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, collectively, form such a force? To answer this question, we must compare the geographical, demographic, economic, and financial capacities of the GCC states with those of Iran. The combined area of the six GCC states is approximately 2.57 million square kilometers, compared to Iran’s 1.65 million square kilometers—a difference of nearly 920,000 square kilometers in favor of the GCC. The significance, however, extends beyond land area to the strategic location of the GCC states, which overlook the Arabian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea, and whose interests are linked to the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, notably the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab. Additionally, their geographic depth within the Arab world grants them significant economic and demographic reach. Demographically, although Iran surpasses the GCC states in population, the GCC’s financial, technological, and educational capacities, if properly utilized, can compensate for a substantial portion of this gap, particularly in defense and production sectors. Economically and financially, the GCC states collectively surpass Iran by a wide margin in terms of economic size, sovereign investment assets, oil and gas reserves, and the capacity to finance economic and military projects, as well as their advanced infrastructure and extensive international ties. The GCC states possess the ability to leverage these capacities within a shared strategic project that transforms fragmented resources into political influence, defensive capability, and independent decision-making. The transition from cooperation to a Gulf union is no longer merely a political aspiration; it has become a strategic necessity dictated by the requirements of security and stability, amid a turbulent political, military, and economic environment, whether due to Iranian interference, regional conflicts, or global economic crises. The strength we seek for the GCC is a deterrent force, not an aggressive one; a protective force, not a hegemonic one. The region can no longer endure further wars, having already suffered enough from the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the war that ended with the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, the repercussions of which the region continues to bear today. Experience has also demonstrated that diplomatic relations and international alliances, however important, are insufficient on their own to ensure security and stability unless they are underpinned by an autonomous strength capable of safeguarding interests and national sovereignty. The time has come to make the historic decision to transition from the GCC to a Gulf union, within an integrated political, economic, and defense framework. If achieving a union involving all six states proves unfeasible, it should begin with those willing to participate, while keeping the door open for others to join in the future. The Gulf states lack neither money, resources, nor strategic location; what they need is the political will to transform these capacities into a unified strength. If history has taught us anything, it is that states that fail to build their own strength will eventually find themselves at the mercy of power balances crafted by others. God keep you safe.