Yemen: When the Return of the State Becomes the Key to Gulf Security

The Yemen crisis today is not merely a protracted war, nor a political dispute that can be reduced to lines of contact. Yemen’s location at the heart of the Arabian Peninsula makes the stability of its state an integral part of Gulf security, the safety of the Kingdom, and the security of the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab strait, as well as the freedom of trade that passes through this region to the world. From this reality stems the Saudi position regarding the Yemeni legitimacy: restoring the state is not a separate Yemeni objective, but a security imperative linked to the fate of the entire region. When Yemeni institutions reassert their presence, the southern border of the Arabian Peninsula regains one of its most important pillars of stability; when militias expand beyond state authority, Yemen becomes an open space for cross-border threats.

The Kingdom has reaffirmed its full political and military support for the Presidential Leadership Council, the Yemeni government, and the Yemeni people, to end the coup, restore the state and its national institutions, while affirming its right to defend its territory, sovereignty, and the security of its citizens and residents. Here, the picture becomes clearer: the Kingdom is not only defending its borders, but also the foundation that prevents the collapse of the Arab state in the face of the militia’s project. The Houthis have not confined their weapons to Yemeni geography; their aggression has extended to cities, civilian and economic facilities in the Kingdom, attempts to target Mecca and Medina, as well as threats to ships in the southern Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab strait. Therefore, protecting the Two Holy Mosques is a top Saudi responsibility, not merely as a geographical issue, but because Mecca and Medina are the religious and human heart of the Islamic world. The targeting of the Taiba power station in Medina, which serves the Prophet’s Mosque, reveals the nature of a threat that makes no distinction between civilian facilities, religious sites, and infrastructure serving millions of Muslims.

In return, the Kingdom does not reduce its support for Yemen to the military dimension. On October 4, it provided more than 224 million riyals to support the Yemeni budget and cover operational expenses and salaries, within a track aimed at stabilizing state institutions and enhancing their capacity to perform their basic functions. This is a point worth noting: the state is not restored by artillery alone; it is restored when institutions have salaries, citizens have services, the economy has a life cycle, and the law has authority. Thus, Saudi support for legitimacy combines protecting the land with supporting its institutions, because security not accompanied by state-building remains temporary.

The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab are the natural extension of this equation. Attempts to target ships, lay mines, and prepare explosive-laden boats do not threaten Yemen or the Kingdom alone; they strike one of the arteries of international navigation and trade. Coalition forces in Hodeidah carried out a naval operation targeting weapons depots, facilities for explosive-laden boats, and naval mines, with the aim of protecting navigation in the Bab al-Mandab strait. Gulf security does not begin only at its borders; it begins in a Yemen where the state regains its status, weapons know their place, and decision-making returns to its institutions. When Yemen returns to the state, the Gulf returns to tranquility, the sea returns to its function, and stability becomes the true victor.