Gulf and Sea Between High and Low Tides!

There may be two theories regarding the current situation in the Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab. The first theory posits that the crisis is, overall, in a state of ebb, receding rapidly, shrinking, and coming to an end, to be ultimately resolved by the clear disparity in the balance of power between its international and regional actors. This is precisely how that power disparity resolved the conflicts with Saddam Hussein in 1991 and 2003, and with Hamas in 2023. According to this view, things will quickly return to their pre-February state. Consequently, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, and the Yemeni Houthis will eventually join the existing political processes in their respective countries. They will exert a significant influence on the policies of those nations due to their demographic and financial weight, as well as their theoretical and organizational capacities, paving the way for peace across the region and initiating reconstruction rather than the destruction caused by wars. Thus, the region is heading toward widespread prosperity from which everyone will benefit.

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Opposing this optimistic theory, which everyone hopes for and desires, is a pessimistic theory whose essence and content are that we are still at the beginning of the crisis, not its end—i.e., in a state of flood. The problem is not as it appears on the surface, namely a dispute between a strong international actor and a weak regional actor that would quickly resolve into war or peace. Rather, the conflict is fundamentally between major global powers, represented by regional states and local parties, within the context of reshaping the global balance of power and the transition from unipolarity to multipolarity. The wars in the region are linked to ongoing conflicts in western Russia with Ukraine, potential future conflicts in eastern Asia over Taiwan, and are connected to continuous trade wars among global poles, reflected in tariff issues. Accordingly, the code of incomprehensible Iranian extremism, the technologically, financially, and militarily backed Houthi expansion, and satellite mapping, among other factors, must be deciphered.

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The final station:

1. It is best for us, as Gulf states, who have wisely and decisively declared from the first day of the crisis that we are against the option of war in the Gulf, and have striven to move, mediate, and pressure to prevent war, to incorporate “ebb and flood” scenarios into our strategic thinking and future calculations so as not to be taken by surprise. If the best and least bad outcome occurs, we will be content with that.

2. However, if actions prove much more truthful than words, revealing that the hidden part of the iceberg is larger than what is visible, and that we are facing a struggle among major powers using regional states, organizations, straits, technology, and weapons to settle their accounts on the chessboard of the region and the world, then we must agree as Gulf states on “available and realistic” options that minimize harm to our peoples and keep us away from the fires of great-power wars. We have, for the record, political leaders capable, through their rationality, wisdom, and diverse relationships, of guiding our Gulf ships to the shores of safety. Thus, what is happening in the region will remain a “crisis and encroachment,” and this challenge will not be the first or the last. As long as the United Nations, like the Arab League, has its secretaries-general speak at length about global problems without moving an inch to resolve them—and when they do move, it is not to solve issues but merely to defer them to later times—the entire world and all Arabs urgently need radical reforms in the United Nations and the Arab League to transform these organizations from spectators in the stands into active players on the field.