When Positions Turn into Spoils
This is not merely Libya’s story, nor the problem of a specific regime. It is one of the greatest catastrophes to befall the Arab world: the transformation of the state from an institution serving the citizen into a tool for power and influence, and the conversion of public office from a trust into a spoils system. Libya is perhaps the clearest example. After the change of regime, we witnessed how the revolution became, for some of its participants, a gateway to wealth and influence. We saw billions spent under various pretexts, the emergence of armed factions, and the successive rise of councils and political institutions. We also saw individuals enter politics from ordinary backgrounds with modest jobs, only to emerge with wealth, homes, cars, and investments disproportionate to what they possessed before assuming responsibility. I am not speaking of all Libyans, nor of all officials, nor accusing everyone of corruption. But Libya offers a stark example of a question larger than Libya itself: How did public office in some Arab countries transform from a trust to serve the nation into a means of enrichment and influence?
The roots of this catastrophe are far older than Libya. In my view, July 23, 1952, was a pivotal moment in modern Arab history and the starting point for a political and military model that subsequently spread across several Arab states. This was the model of military coups, personal rule, and republics that raised slogans of liberation, justice, and unity, yet in many cases ended up weakening institutions and prioritizing loyalty to the ruler, the party, and the military over the rule of law. Coups followed one another, monarchies fell in various Arab countries, and regimes emerged that championed nationalism, socialism, revolution, and liberation. But what was the result in many cases? Institutions stalled, political life weakened, genuine power alternation disappeared, loyalty became more important than competence, public money became a source of influence, and for some, attaining office became the shortest path to wealth.
Then came the greatest catastrophe: whenever a regime fell, there were no strong institutions capable of filling the vacuum. The regime collapsed, and the state collapsed with it. Thus, some peoples paid the price of change twice—once for despotism, and once for the chaos that followed its fall. In contrast, we find Arab monarchies that, to varying degrees, preserved the continuity, institutions, and stability of the state and achieved significant levels of security, reconstruction, and development, such as Morocco, Jordan, and the Gulf states. This does not mean that monarchies are without faults, nor that all republics have failed. But we have the right to pose the historical question with courage: Was the overthrow of monarchies and the establishment of military republican regimes the right path to building the Arab state? Or did we replace the problem of the ruler with the problem of the regime, replace despotism with chaos, replace the state with a party or military institution, and replace service to the nation with a struggle over spoils?
Libya is not the root of the problem; it is one of the outcomes of a larger Arab issue. The solution lies neither in returning to the past nor in sanctifying any regime. It lies in building a state of institutions, law, accountability, transparency, and genuine alternation of power—a state in which office is a duty, not an honor; public money is a trust, not a spoil; and politics is service, not trade. For the greatest catastrophe to befall the Arab world was not only the despotism of some rulers, but the fact that, even after their departure, we have yet to build the state that prevents despotism and corruption from returning.
July 23, 1952, was not merely a day in Egyptian history; it was a major turning point in Arab history. Today, after more than seventy years of experience, we have the right to reread that history, free from sanctification and slogans—not to condemn the past, but to know the truth. What did the Arabs gain? What did they lose? And was the price paid by the peoples worth everything that happened?
