Safe Distance Strategy for Small States

Small states no longer operate in an international environment that allows them to rely on the stability of alliances, the clarity of rivalries, or the continuity of guarantees as they have known them for decades. The world is entering a more fluid stage, where interests intersect with threats, rivals cooperate on one file while allies compete on another, and the boundaries between economics, security, technology, information, and military power blur. Amidst this acceleration, the question is no longer “Who do we stand with?” but rather “How do we stand, where do we stand, and what distance should be maintained from each party to benefit from the relationship without losing decision-making autonomy?”

This is evident in the current regional landscape. The decline of certain U.S. roles does not signify its disappearance from the region, but rather a redistribution of functions and burdens. Major powers remain within a vertical, supra-regional engine that exerts influence through military force, intelligence, finance, technology, markets, sanctions, and alliances. Meanwhile, major regional powers operate within a horizontal engine to reposition themselves, build partnerships, and arrange power balances. In this context, Iran seeks to transition from a state contained within a system created by others to a power participating in shaping future security arrangements. Other regional powers are rebuilding their partnerships, while the roles of China, Russia, and Europe are expanding. Thus, no simple vacuum arises waiting to be filled; instead, a multi-layered space emerges where international and regional forces intersect and compete for influence, bases, and capabilities.

The small state sits at the intersection of these two engines. Misreading either one may push it into a position it did not choose or force it into a confrontation it did not decide to enter. Here, the need for a “strategy of safe distances” becomes apparent. This does not mean standing at an equal distance from everyone, nor does it imply neutrality or holding the stick from the middle. Rather, it involves creating a margin that allows the state to cooperate with others without being held hostage to them, to benefit from external capabilities without turning them into critical dependencies, and to enter partnerships without surrendering sovereign decision-making to a partner. A state may be security-aligned with one power, economically linked to another, technologically connected to a third, conversing with an adversary while cooperating with a neighbor, without contradiction, as long as national interest determines the distance in each domain.

These distances have three boundaries that move within the gray zone and require continuous management. First is the distance of cooperation, which enables access to knowledge, markets, investments, technology, security, and capabilities. Second is the distance of hedging, which prevents cooperation from turning into critical dependency. Third is the distance of prevention, which begins when an external party attempts to access sovereign decision-making, penetrate institutions, or use the economy, society, infrastructure, or cyberspace to exert pressure. Within this gray zone, interests mix with pressures, cooperation blends with competition, and partnership intertwines with attempts at influence. Therefore, success does not lie in constant proximity or distance, but in knowing when to draw close, when to hedge, and when to say, “Here the relationship ends and sovereignty begins.”

These boundaries become more critical when the conflict itself moves into the gray zone, where pressures may be transmitted through intermediaries, companies, banks, ships, or financial and technological networks that appear commercial and legitimate on the surface. The U.S. “economic pariah” campaign against Iran reveals the breadth of this domain. Sanctions do not target Iran alone; they extend to third parties that facilitate its access to finance, markets, technology, and shipping, potentially turning the intermediary itself into a target for secondary sanctions. Here, the small state faces a double risk: becoming, unintentionally, a conduit for a targeted party, or having its institutions and markets become alternative channels after other routes are closed. Therefore, managing safe distance becomes the ability to identify the intermediary, understand its function, and uncover any deception or malice hidden behind it before the effects of the conflict reach inside the state. When one path closes, another may appear; when the tool changes, the function may remain.

A small state cannot anticipate every surprise, but it can build immunity to mitigate their effects. Early vision provides time, capability provides resilience, alternatives provide choices, and choices protect decision-making autonomy. The Kuwaiti experience offers a historical example of the danger of confusing peace with appeasement. The sincere desire to avoid conflict, coupled with excessive trust and goodwill, does not protect a small state if it is not accompanied by a continuous assessment of risks and readiness for shifts in intentions. The problem was not that Kuwait desired peace—peace is the goal of the state and a supreme value—but that peace was mistakenly understood as a reason to delay addressing problems or ignoring alarming signals. The lesson of August 2, 1990, reinforces that peace does not mean surrender, and a small state does not protect its independence through goodwill alone, but through vigilance, capability, hedging, and alternative leverage.

This does not imply isolation or withdrawal from regional arrangements. Small states need collective security more than major powers, but it is in their interest for such security to be based on rules rather than the hegemony of a single party. Non-aggression, protection of navigation, energy, water, and civilian infrastructure, non-use of one state’s territory against another, prevention of proxies from crossing boundaries, respect for sovereignty, and mechanisms for early warning, communication, and crisis management can produce a more stable security environment than a race to build counter-balancing axes. Engineering safe distances in this complexity requires institutional efficiency, flexibility, and adaptability, because an economic decision may carry security implications, a commercial decision may yield political effects, and technological investment may create strategic dependency. What is required is an integrated state mindset that links foreign policy with defense, economy, finance, energy, technology, society, and infrastructure, presenting leadership with a comprehensive picture of risks, opportunities, choices, and alternatives. This ensures that national interest remains the center of this system: no friendship justifies dependency, no rivalry prevents dialogue, no alliance negates self-capacity, and no independence means dispensing with others.

The world is rearranging its distances, alliances are redefining their functions, and major and regional powers are recalculating their positions and placements. Small states cannot stop this movement, but they can prevent others from determining their place within it. This is the philosophy of safe distances: to be close enough to cooperate, distant enough not to be dependent, capable enough to reject coercion, and aware enough to know when to change the distance. Peace is its goal, knowledge its shield, and awareness regulates its distances.