Why the Ukraine War Benefits Putin

Putin insists on the war for geopolitical and domestic political reasons
Translated by Alqyas from Al-Jarida — Original source
As Vladimir Putin continues to thwart President Donald Trump’s attempts to broker a peaceful settlement to the war in Ukraine, the White House should pose a fundamental question: Why is the Russian president so determined to prolong this conflict to such an extent?
Strategically, Russia’s costly land war appears to be stumbling in achieving its objectives. It is draining an economy already plagued by imbalances and pressures, imposing heavy costs on Moscow not only for what it spends in Ukraine but also for the opportunities and resources it forfeits in other regions. The Kremlin’s focus on the war has weakened its ability to protect its influence in places such as Armenia and Syria.
We analysts have repeatedly highlighted the grave strategic error Putin committed by invading Ukraine. Yet none of these arguments, however logical, have altered his calculations. He does not appear willing to back down.
I see two main reasons for this insistence. First, Putin is well aware that showing retreat is not an option for him. Even if he were convinced that a swift end to the war would serve his interests, he would not allow himself to appear weak or hesitant, as any sign of confusion would give Ukrainians greater incentive to hold firm and demand better terms, while undermining his image and standing within Russia. For a leader who built his power on projecting strength and control, admitting failure could be as costly as continuing the war itself.
The second, more significant reason is that Putin may not view the war as a pure burden; rather, he sees it as having yielded political, military, and geopolitical gains that offset a portion of its enormous costs.
The war has strengthened his grip on power, narrowed the space for his political opponents, and reshaped the Russian economy to serve the needs of the military establishment. It has also forced the Russian military to abandon certain outdated practices, adapt to the nature of modern warfare, and develop the technology and industrial capabilities required to keep pace with rapid changes in military affairs.
In other words, while Ukraine may be faring better than Moscow expected on the battlefield, Putin perceives a completely different picture at the international level: in his calculus, Russia is winning the battle for alliances and influence.
The longer the war drags on, the stronger Moscow’s ties with China and North Korea become, and the more effective their partnerships with Russia grow. Conversely, the democratic coalition supporting Ukraine is beginning to show signs of fatigue and division. This may well be the gain that matters most to Putin, surpassing any territorial advances.
He is watching the decline of the transatlantic alliance and sees the European landscape as reinforcing his bet. Germany may increase its military spending, but the Kremlin is monitoring the falling approval ratings of Chancellor Friedrich Merz and does not view Berlin as a major source of concern. In France, the upcoming presidential elections in the spring may offer an opportunity for the rise of a Russia-friendly candidate. Meanwhile, Putin views the European and NATO responses to escalating Russian provocations as slow and tepid, reinforcing his conviction that Europe remains unable to overcome its political divisions.
The staggering human losses suffered by Russia do not appear to have altered these calculations to the extent the West had hoped. If Putin believed that the scale of losses had become unsustainable, he could have halted the costly and faltering ground offensive and instead focused on intensifying air strikes. However, he has chosen to continue the ground attack, implying that he either considers these losses an acceptable price or believes that Ukraine, due to its limited human resources, will be unable to sustain its resistance against the current pace of fighting. He may also recognize that continuing land battles forces his generals to keep developing the military and modernizing combat tactics.
In the air war, Putin has other reasons to believe that time is on his side. True, Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian oil facilities and commercial infrastructure have inflicted damage on Moscow and caused embarrassment, but they have not yet threatened Russia’s ability to continue the war.
Russian strikes, meanwhile, target more sensitive vulnerabilities in Ukraine: the energy and water networks upon which the population and economy depend during the winter. Ukrainians fear that prolonged outages of electricity and heating will trigger new waves of displacement toward the West, further exhausting their country’s economy. Additionally, targeting cities and critical infrastructure could force Kyiv to divert its limited defensive weapons from protecting its forces on the front lines to shielding civilians and civilian facilities.
There is no doubt that Putin knows that the costs of the war for Russia may eventually become unsustainable. However, he is now betting that time is on his side and that prolonging the conflict will weaken Ukraine and deepen Western divisions. If the war ultimately undermines the Western alliance, Putin may view all the prices Russia has paid as justified.
Nevertheless, the West still has the capacity to alter the Kremlin’s calculations, provided it acts as a unified alliance. But Moscow has increasingly ruled out this possibility and may no longer see in Western behavior any reason to believe it will materialize.
Upholding principles such as democracy, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and human rights is one thing; making clear decisions and coordinated moves that compel Putin to recalculate is entirely different. So far, the Kremlin has not seen enough of such action.
Therefore, it is difficult to expect a change in Putin’s stance unless Western behavior itself changes. No matter how attractive exit routes and settlements former President Trump and his advisors may propose, the Russian president will lack a genuine incentive to accept them as long as he believes that continuing the war serves his interests more than ending it does.