Voluntary amendment and the question of will

When the head of Iraq’s highest judicial authority speaks about amending the constitution, the statement is not to be dismissed as a passing remark. We know well that he has witnessed the political deadlock from within, and has seen how constitutional obligations are repeatedly stalled, cycle after cycle. Accordingly, in London, Chief Justice Faiq Zaidan, head of the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council, called for reconsidering Article 76, so that the winning list would be granted the right to form the government. He stated that this was his personal and legal opinion, acknowledging that many political forces reject it. He also spoke of an amendment that could be achieved through voluntary political agreement.

From a constitutional standpoint, this remark raises a legitimate question. Article 126 outlines a specific amendment procedure: it requires a proposal from designated entities, a special majority in the Council of Representatives, a popular referendum, and the consent of the relevant region if the amendment affects its competencies. This process relies less on voluntariness than on strict adherence to legal commitments.

However, the political reality clarifies the intent. Procedures alone are insufficient when trust among political forces is absent. Any amendment that alters the balance of power is viewed as a gain for one side and a loss for another. Thus, political will appears as a prerequisite for the text, not its outcome.

Press sources reported that Zaidan discussed in London a broader vision, leaning toward a presidential system instead of a parliamentary one, while acknowledging the difficulty of implementing such a change under current conditions.

If true, this would shift the nature of the debate from reforming provisions to redesigning the system altogether—a matter for the people and their representatives, not for the judiciary. A judge’s role is to identify the flaws exposed by experience, which falls squarely within his expertise: the failure to elect a president, disputes over identifying the largest bloc, and the prolonged periods preceding the formation of governments. These are genuine constitutional questions awaiting answers. Therefore, we maintain that amendment is not an end in itself; its value lies in addressing existing flaws without creating new ones, and in being pursued through proper constitutional channels and with broad consensus. Experience has taught us that a text cannot substitute for the will to implement it. Until then, commitment to the current constitutional text remains the first step.