4 Scenarios for Iran Post-Israeli and US Congressional Elections

The Israeli elections on the 27th of this month and the US midterm congressional elections on November 3 next year carry significance that transcends the calculations of power in Tel Aviv and Washington, as their outcomes may determine the direction of US policy toward Iran, whether by resuming military strikes or seeking a settlement that ends the war. Benjamin Netanyahu’s continued hold on power, coupled with Republicans retaining control of both chambers of Congress, could provide new opportunities for escalation advocates, whereas opposite results could open the door to a different approach, albeit not necessarily one more lenient toward Tehran.

The importance of these electoral contests stems from their coincidence with the stagnation of US-Iranian negotiations, ongoing disputes over the Strait of Hormuz and the blockade imposed on Iranian oil ports, as well as diverging priorities between Washington and Tel Aviv. While Donald Trump seeks to achieve tangible results before the economic and political costs of the crisis escalate, Netanyahu may attempt to exploit what he considers an opportunity to weaken Iran and push the US president to resume strikes. On this basis, four electoral scenarios emerge that could chart different paths for the coming phase, ranging from escalation to containing the war through negotiation.

Netanyahu’s retention of the Israeli premiership, alongside Republicans maintaining control of both congressional chambers, represents the most dangerous scenario for the prospects of containing the war. In this case, Netanyahu would face a US president with a wider political margin for military action, without encountering strong legislative opposition from his own party or rivals.

Netanyahu enters the elections in an uncomfortable position, as opinion polls do not guarantee him the ability to form a right-wing and religious majority, while the “Together” list, combining Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, competes for the position of the largest force. If the parties fail to form a stable coalition, Israel may head toward new elections in spring 2027, with Netanyahu remaining in office during the transitional period.

This possibility may reinforce Netanyahu’s motives to continue confrontation. He views weakening Iran as a long-awaited strategic opportunity and may seek to exploit what he perceives as a decline in Iran’s capabilities to push Trump to resume strikes, rather than allowing Tehran to catch its breath and rebuild its capacities.

In Washington, Republicans retaining control of both congressional chambers would allow Trump to present the result as a renewed mandate for his policies, potentially encouraging him to pursue more hardline options. However, this mandate would not be absolute; the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz and rising fuel and living costs could impose economic and political constraints on him, even in the absence of effective legislative opposition.

The danger in this scenario is that Netanyahu’s desire to complete the weakening of Iran may converge with Trump’s capacity to act militarily, thereby diminishing the chances of a settlement before its contours become clear.

Conversely, the rise of a new Israeli leadership, coinciding with a Democratic victory in both congressional chambers, could create a more conducive environment for a negotiated settlement. However, this does not mean Israel will automatically shift to a softer policy toward Iran, nor that Democrats will oppose all use of force.

Bennett and Gadi Eisenkot, if they play a pivotal role in the next government, belong to the Israeli security establishment and are not expected to abandon a hardline approach to Iranian threats. Nevertheless, a new government might be less dependent on far-right parties that reject any agreement, more willing to coordinate publicly with Washington, and more mindful of US political balances.

Conversely, if Democrats gain control of both chambers of Congress, they will face pressure to fulfill their campaign pledges to lower fuel and food prices and alleviate economic burdens. This would strengthen incentives to seek a settlement that reopens the Strait of Hormuz and limits the war’s fallout, rather than continuing a confrontational approach that drains the economy and keeps energy prices high.

However, Democrats will also need to avoid turning their victory into an open political campaign to weaken Trump, whether by pursuing his impeachment or intensifying investigations into his administration. Focusing on partisan confrontation could alienate voters who want direct solutions to their economic problems, and any strategy targeting Trump alone could harm the party’s prospects in the 2028 elections.

This scenario does not guarantee peace, but it could combine an Israeli government more capable of reaching an understanding with Washington with a Congress that has political and economic interest in ending the war through a feasible agreement.

Netanyahu might remain in power while Democrats take control of the U.S. House of Representatives, with Republicans retaining the Senate. In that case, Israel’s desire to continue military pressure would meet an American administration still able to issue military orders but under stricter legislative oversight.

A Democratic victory in the House could lead them to introduce resolutions limiting war powers, hold hearings on the legal basis and costs of military operations, and exert pressure on war funding and arms transfers. While it may be difficult to translate these moves into binding restrictions given the possibility of a Trump veto, they would raise the political cost of any further escalation.

In this environment, Netanyahu might continue pressuring the White House to resume strikes, while Democrats attempt to demonstrate that the war lacks sufficient domestic support and that its continuation offers no solution to the economic crisis or to navigation disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.

The impact of this division extends beyond Washington and Tel Aviv. Tehran may interpret internal U.S. divisions as an indication of Trump’s diminishing capacity to continue the war without constraints, potentially encouraging it to harden its negotiating stance. Conversely, Israel may view the narrowing of U.S. maneuvering space as making it more urgent to accelerate the achievement of its military objectives.

The likely outcome is increased friction between Washington and Tel Aviv and growing political criticism of the war, without guaranteeing an end to operations or the development of a joint exit strategy.

The electoral outcomes could lead to a result opposite to the previous scenario: Netanyahu leaving office, with Republicans retaining control of both chambers of Congress. Here, new Israeli leadership might find itself facing an American administration less constrained legislatively, but one that does not necessarily share all its assessments regarding Iran.

The new Israeli government might be more willing to coordinate with Washington on the timing and objectives of operations, and less inclined to adopt demands from far-right coalition partners who reject a settlement. However, this does not mean it would abandon pressure on Tehran or accept an agreement that fails to alleviate its security concerns.

Conversely, Republican control of Congress could give Trump greater leeway to continue operations, but economic pressures would remain a decisive factor. Rising energy prices, worsening inflation, and ongoing navigation disruptions in the “Strait of Hormuz” could make prolonging the war politically costly even for a president whose party controls both chambers.

This configuration could create space for an American-Israeli understanding on using military pressure within a political track, but it may also generate disagreements over the limits of escalation and the conditions for an agreement with Iran. The outcome will depend on whether Trump views negotiation as a means to end the war, or whether he will continue to use military threats to extract further concessions from Tehran.

In this scenario, restraint will not come from Congress, but may arise from diverging calculations between Washington and the new Israeli leadership, as well as from the economic costs the war imposes on the American administration.

Regardless of the election results, Washington and Tel Aviv’s capacity to make decisions will not be the sole factor determining the war’s trajectory. Iran has demonstrated a willingness to absorb strikes and continue the confrontation, while retaining retaliatory tools that could target commercial shipping and US bases in the region. Moreover, the continuation of sanctions has not yet compelled the Iranian leadership to accept all US demands.

Tehran appears to be betting that prolonging the crisis will increase economic pressures on the United States, deepen rifts between Washington and Tel Aviv, and buy time to improve its negotiating position. This gamble is reinforced by the divergence among stated US objectives: reopening the Strait of Hormuz requires an urgent settlement to ease market disruptions, whereas imposing lasting constraints on Iran’s nuclear program would likely entail longer negotiations and different conditions.

Furthermore, US support for Israel will not be insulated from the election results. It has become a subject of broader political and public contention than before, with voters linking the war to rising prices and a declining sense of security. Republicans, for their part, face the challenge of convincing their base that Trump has fulfilled his promises to improve the economy and end foreign wars, while Democrats seek to capitalize on anger over the cost of living, tariffs, and the war.

Whether any party can translate this discontent into actual votes remains an open question. The massive funds spent on election campaigns, partisan advertising, and the participation of independent voters and groups that typically vote only in presidential elections will shape the composition of the next Congress.

Regardless of the outcome, the US administration will find itself compelled to resolve a question that has long perplexed its strategy: Is the priority to reopen the Strait of Hormuz quickly, to impose long-term constraints on Iran’s nuclear program, or to achieve both objectives? Continued closure of the strait raises the cost of the war for the global economy, while destroying individual facilities or military capabilities does not guarantee the elimination of the threats that concern Washington and its allies. Without a clear prioritization, military strikes may devolve into repeated rounds that fail to resolve the conflict and offer no stable path toward an agreement.

The results of the Israeli elections will also require Washington to recalibrate its relationship with the incoming leadership, while the composition of Congress will determine the extent of political opposition available to Trump. Keeping Gulf partners and Pakistan engaged in mediation will be essential to prevent the collapse of the remaining diplomatic track, given that the June experience showed that while negotiation can temporarily halt fighting, it is insufficient on its own to address fundamental disagreements.

Ultimately, elections will not automatically end the war, nor will they guarantee that any new Israeli leadership or a democratic majority will reach an agreement. However, they will shape the political environment in which subsequent decisions are made: whether it is a US-Israeli alignment driving a new round of escalation, internal pressures and disagreements between the allies opening a window for negotiation, or divisions preventing the adoption of a clear strategy.

The election results will largely determine the direction of the next phase of the war with Iran. Netanyahu’s meeting with Republicans could bolster the prospects of resuming strikes, whereas the emergence of a new Israeli leadership, coinciding with the Democrats’ rise in Congress, could create broader scope for containing escalation and reaching a settlement. Between these two scenarios, shifts in the balance of power in Washington and Tel Aviv could lead to clashes of priorities that confuse US decision-making, granting Tehran an opportunity to exploit these divisions. Thus, the significance of the elections extends beyond determining who holds power; it also hinges on whether the war will move toward a new round of escalation, follow a diplomatic track, or remain stuck between renewed military pressure and an inability to impose a settlement.