Between Plan and Trap... The Decline of the System and the Building of an Alternative
There are two analytical frameworks for interpreting the Middle East’s trajectory in the coming years. The first assumes that the redrawing of the Middle East’s map and the redivision of influence—granting the Zionist entity predominant control over regional affairs under the banner of a “New Middle East”—will remain the prevailing order. This scenario envisions a power-sharing arrangement between the Zionist entity and Iran, orchestrated and supervised by the United States, as the most likely outcome for the region over the next decade.
The second perspective, which I adopt and consider more probable, anticipates a more pronounced balance of power, heavily favoring a new alliance comprising Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Gulf states, with Syria and Jordan as key partners, and full coordination with Pakistan. This realistic configuration, rapidly taking shape over the past two years, is poised to dominate the Middle East. I believe its evidence is already evident, with direct and influential participation from its key actors.
The Zionist entity, despite its resistance, will experience contraction and decline—perhaps even more than that. We need not rush to elaborate on what lies beyond mere decline. The entity has already suffered significant repercussions regarding its existence, support, and capacity to pursue expansionist ambitions following “Al-Aqsa Flood” and the subsequent egregious, condemnable actions that hastened its European allies’ abandonment, condemnation, and potential imposition of sanctions, boycotts, and isolation. Concurrently, the American public has begun to turn against the entity, inciting opposition to it. Multiple U.S. lobbies have emerged, openly working against the entity’s interests in America, systematically tracking and condemning those who publicly support or justify it. This trend will become increasingly clear in the coming days, imposing heavy costs on anyone who supports or rationalizes the entity’s existence, unless a genuine Palestinian state is established on its pre-1967 borders—a demand gaining traction in the U.S. and finding acceptance within movements like MAGA, alongside other such lobbying groups.
This shift is already reflecting in the most pro-Zionist administration in U.S. history. Trump is gradually distancing himself, as are influential figures within his administration and party.
Iran, too, is nearing the end of the influence granted to it through power-sharing and understanding with the Zionist entity. Its presence in Syria is ending, and its position in Lebanon is on the brink of collapse. Its role in expanding influence over Gulf states is waning, mirroring the Zionist entity’s decline. Severing Iran’s hand from the Strait of Hormuz will be among the most significant manifestations of this shift, based on a realistic plan rather than a provocative trap. The strait, which gave birth to the world’s energy crisis, will be internationalized—a trend already showing early signs of U.S. and European involvement.
The balance of power, led by the new Turkish-Saudi-Egyptian-Gulf alliance, with Syria and Jordan as partners and coordination with Pakistan, will expand rapidly. Iran’s presence in Yemen and Iraq will end, likely by 2027 at the latest. The arrangement of the region will realistically be entrusted to this alliance, with U.S. approval, which enjoys international acceptance, domestic and international legitimacy, strong political presence, superior military capabilities, and unparalleled financial resources. Through this alliance, the Middle East will reclaim its crucial role in promoting stability in the region, activating its function as an economic and financial gateway to the world, and serving as a deterrent against the illegitimate and resource-depleted Zionist and Iranian forces. I see the contours of this formation emerging, advancing along its paths, and fulfilling its responsibilities through unprecedented cooperation and consensus. Both Iran and the Zionist entity will shrink to diminishing boundaries, with the possibility of Iran losing territory, and the actual establishment of a Palestinian state within its pre-1967 borders.
What was intended as a plan, perhaps even a trap, has transformed into a new, realistic, and pragmatic strategy. The decline of the two powers that once dominated the Middle East—and which may have harbored ambitions beyond that dominance—has now come to an end, as their path toward decline paves the way for an alternative system, filled and led by the new alliance.
