A Game of Time and Pressure: Why Iran Undermines Temporary Ceasefires
Adel Abdullah Al-Mutairi: Wars are not fought with missiles alone; indeed, the hands of the clock may prove more decisive. Some nations fight to gain territory, others to buy time, while certain regimes recognize that the passage of time itself is their greatest adversary. From this perspective, a crucial aspect of Iran’s behavior during each escalation cycle in the region becomes clear.
For years, the United States has appeared less interested in launching a full-scale war against Iran than in managing the conflict and keeping it under control. While military strikes have slowed Iran’s nuclear program and inflicted significant damage on its facilities, a prolonged truce that does not culminate in a comprehensive agreement grants Washington an additional advantage. It freezes the status quo at a point deemed more favorable to the U.S., while sanctions continue to drain the Iranian economy year after year.
In Tehran, however, the clock ticks to a different rhythm. A temporary truce, unless it includes genuine sanctions relief and the release of frozen assets, is not viewed as an opportunity for de-escalation, but rather as a phase in which economic erosion continues and social pressures mount. Consequently, time is not a neutral factor for the Iranian regime, but an adversary threatening its internal cohesion. This explains Tehran’s tendency to sabotage ceasefires and reignite tensions whenever it senses that a crisis is losing momentum.
More dangerously, Iran refuses to confine the confrontation to its direct dealings with the United States. If direct U.S. strikes cease or military escalation subsides, it does not mean the region has entered a period of calm. Instead, Iran shifts the confrontation to other arenas through its affiliated terrorist militias. Missiles and drones launched from Iraq or Yemen are not read in isolation from the broader picture, but as extensions of Iran’s pressure tools when direct retaliation becomes too costly.
Gulf states are paying a price that does not concern them directly. Rather than keeping the clash between Washington and Tehran contained, Gulf cities, energy facilities, and sea lanes are transformed into arenas for exchanging messages. This is not a policy of self-defense, but a deliberate expansion of the danger zone, using the region’s stability and the prosperity of its peoples as bargaining chips in a negotiating struggle.
Observers of Iran’s behavior note that it is based on a constant principle: “Pressure cards must not run out.” If the effectiveness of the nuclear program wanes under the weight of strikes and sanctions, the value of the Strait of Hormuz rises. If Gulf states seek to reduce their dependence on Hormuz through alternative export routes, pressure shifts to the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea via the terrorist Houthi group. If the direct confrontation with the United States cools, militias affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iraq return to escalate threats, target interests and bases, and endanger Gulf security, ensuring that escalation continues even as its theaters change.
This is not a strategy seeking a full-scale war, nor one aiming for permanent peace, but rather a perpetual crisis whose intensity can be controlled. Whenever Tehran loses a pressure card, it rushes to produce another. If tensions cool on one front, another ignites. It does not allow the crisis to end, because its conclusion would diminish the bargaining value of its cards.
The true condemnation of this approach lies in its treatment of regional security not as a shared responsibility or a commitment to good-neighborly conduct, but as a tool for political blackmail. Neither international navigation security, nor energy market stability, nor the safety of Gulf cities should remain hostage to negotiating calculations or serve as a means for any party to improve its position at the negotiating table.
Therefore, viewing the situation solely as a conflict over the nuclear program is an incomplete reading. At its core, the issue concerns who holds the power to control both time and geography. Washington bets that the passage of time will gradually weaken Iran, while Tehran bets that threatening straits, activating armed proxies, and keeping the region in a state of continuous tension will make the world less capable of waiting for the results of a policy of attrition.
In conclusion, Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab may not be the true objectives; rather, the goal is to keep the entire region hostage to a single equation: the more options narrow for Tehran, the wider the crisis becomes. The closer the region comes to calm, the more a new flashpoint is reignited, because some regimes do not feed on peace, but on crisis management, turning Gulf security and global trade stability into mere bargaining chips to be deployed whenever they need to improve their position at the table.
